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even less desirable, and though the husband is said to be taxed, she feels
it as if she were taxed.
Finally the Davis position complicates divorce negotiations and frus-
trates domestic relations purposes for what is probably an insufficient
revenue return. In the interests of fairness and consistency Congress
should overrule Davis.
INEQUITIES IN CORPORATE PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS
One of the present problem areas in income tax law is the taxability
of voluntary payments by a corporate employer to a widow or other
survivors of a deceased employee. This situation usually arises in closely
held corporations or with executive employees. The Internal Revenue
Code allows an exclusion of $5,000 to the beneficiaries or the estate of
the employee if the payments are made by reason of the death of the
employee.1 However, if the employee is entitled to receive the payments
while living, the beneficiaries or the estate of the employee do not qualify
for the exclusion The problem area concerns whether the amount in
excess of $5,000 is to be treated as income or a gift. If the payment can
qualify as a gift, it is wholly excludable from the gross income of the
recipient,3 and the corporation is able to treat the payment as an expense. 4
Recent cases in the United States Courts of Appeals have held that
amounts in excess of $5,000 are gifts,5 while other cases have held them
to be taxable income.6 The cases that have classified the payments as
1. T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2 (1957), provides that the exclusion does not apply to
amounts which constituted income payable to the employee during his life as compensa-
tion for services, such as bonuses, unused leave, or uncollected salary, plus other amounts
to which the employee possessed a nonforfeitable right. A nonforfeitable right in-
cludes amounts to which the employee was entitled while living if he had made an
election or demand, or upon termination of employment, such as under a pension or
profit-sharing plan.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
4. See, e.g., Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 31 T.C. 1080 (1959) ; I. Putnam, Inc.,
15 T.C. 86 (1950), acq., 1950-2 Cum. BuIL. 4.
5. Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962), reversing 19 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1379 (1960), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d
671 (8th Cir. 1962), reversing 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
903 (1962) ; United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962), affirming 192 F.
Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; United States v. Kasyn-
ski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
6. Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 556
(1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962) ; Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir. 1962), affirming 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962).
NOTES
gifts have resulted in certain inequities and have created a potential abuse
of the tax law. A review of the law preceding the conflicting interpre-
tations will serve to place the problem in its proper legal context and
provide a basis for an analysis of the tax consequences of such voluntary
payments.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled in 1939 that voluntary pay-
ments by an employer to the widow of an officer-stockholder were gifts
and not taxable income, so long as she did not render services to the
payer." This ruling was in effect until 1950, when the Commissioner
held such payments, if in consideration for services rendered by the de-
ceased officer or employee, includable in the gross income of the widow.'
The Commissioner's contention in I.T. 4027 was that failure to perform
services by the widow was irrelevant in determining the taxability of the
payments, so long as the payments were for services rendered. The
reversal of the Commissioner's position appears to have been prompted
by the case of Louise K. Aprill,9 where the Tax Court held that the volun-
tary payments were gifts, since in conformity with I.T. 3329, no services
had been rendered by the widow. Prior to the Aprill case, the disputes
that arose concerning the taxability of payments to a widow by an em-
ployer were few, and generally the payments were not of a voluntary
nature as in I.T. 3329.10 It is apparent that the Commissioner issued
I.T. 4027 to restrain an increase in the use of these payments as a tax
avoidance device.
The courts were not sympathetic to the position taken by the Com-
missioner in I.T. 4027. The Government suffered losses in virtually
every case that immediately followed the announcement.11 In Estate of
Arthur W. Hellstrom,2 the Tax Court came into direct contact with I.T.
4027 and rejected the ruling. Prior cases merely ignored it." In the
cases which followed the ruling, the widows continued to receive favor-
7. I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 153.
8. I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. BuLL. 9.
9. 13 T.C. 707 (1949).
10. For a summary of these early cases, see 39 Ky. L.J. 363 (1951).
11. Marie G. Haskell, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (7955); Estate of Arthur W.
Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955); Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
577 (1955); Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308 (1954); Alice M. Macfarlane, 19
T.C. 9 (1952). Contra, Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951),
affirming 14 T.C. 1433 (1950); Fisher v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass.
1955).
12. 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
13. Marie G. Haskell, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1955); Estate of Ralph W.
Reardon, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1955); Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308
(1954) ; Alice M. Macfarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952).
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able treatment from the courts. 4 These adverse decisions forced the
Commissioner to modify his position with respect to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.'"
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 contained no statutory provi-
sions dealing with death payments received from an employer until the
enactment of Section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1951.1" This section
of the Revenue Act permitted the beneficiaries and the estate of the em-
ployee to exclude from taxable income $5,000 of payments received under
a pre-existing contract with the employer. The object of the new pro-
vision was to equalize the tax consequences of the contractual payments
with the exclusion provided recipients under group life insurance plans."
The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner under section 302
stressed the requirement of a pre-existing contract to qualify for the
exemption. Therefore, the amendment had no effect on the voluntary
payment to widows since the prior cases had classified the payments as
gifts and within that exemption provision of the Code."
The requirement of a pre-existing contractual obligation for the
$5,000 exclusion was deleted from the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The Government then took the position that section 101 (b) of the 1954
Code limited the widow's exemption to $5,000.'9 A few cases contained
dicta in support of this contention.2" The courts, however, refused to
accept this construction and continued to hold the payments to widows
free from taxation." The basis for the decision was that Congress in-
tended to equalize the tax consequences of contractual and voluntary
payments, since under the Revenue Act of 1951 the voluntary payments
14. For a collection of cases and discussion of decisions rendered in favor of the
taxpayer see Pelisek, Tax Treatment of Payments to the Widows of Corporate Officers
and Employees, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 16 (1960).
15. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that it would not litigate, under the 1939
CODE, cases involving the taxability of voluntary payments to widows unless there was
clear evidence that they were intended as compensation. The Service stated that its
position with respect to the 1954 CODE involved other considerations. Rev. Rul. 58-613,
1958-2 Cum. BULL. 914.
16. INT. REv. CODE oF 1939, § 22(b) (1), added by ch. 521, 65 Stat. 483 (1951).
17. For a discussion of this point see Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives'
Widows, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAx 815, 831 (1961).
18. Ibid.
19. Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 32.
20. Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Rodner v. United
States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
21. Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), affd, 302 F.2d
666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp.
223 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Cowan v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960) ; Read v. United States, 177
F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1960), aff'd mem., 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
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had been covered.22 Because of the adverse decisions as to this construc-
tion, the Internal Revenue Service abandoned its position that the volun-
tary payments to widows were limited to $5,000.23 However, the Com-
missioner still refused to relinquish the position taken in I.T. 4027."4
The courts during this period recognized certain criteria for deter-
mining whether the payments constituted gifts. The following factors,
established in the Hellstrom case' and affirmed in other cases,2" were
considered to be controlling: (1) the voluntary nature of the payments,
(2) made directly to the widow, (3) who performed no services for the
corporation, (4) which received no benefit from the payment, and (5)
which were not in lieu of compensation to her husband for services
rendered during his lifetime." While these standards were generally
adhered to by the courts, occasional deviations appeared. The existence
of a plan or established pattern for such payments, which rendered an
economic benefit to the corporation, has been held sufficient to prevent
an exclusion of the payment as a gift.2" Also, payments by a family
owned corporation were held to be dividends and thus taxable as income."
The Commissioner in Duberstein v. Commissioier 0 proposed a test
for determining whether a gratuitous transfer was a gift or income based
22. The requirement that there be a pre-existing contract to qualify for the $5,000
was eliminated through the suggestion of public utility associations at Congressional
Hearings. These utility companies were not bound to pay fixed death benefits, and
such payments were therefore taxable to the recipient since there was no pre-existing
contract. The utilities sought to eliminate this inequity where in substance their pay-
ments were similar to a firm contract. Crown, supra note 17, at 832. District Judge
Weinfeld in Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786, 789 (1961), stated that
[T]he legislative history . . . abundantly demonstrates that it had no relation-
ship to the 'gift-compensation' controversy-on the contrary, it was enacted to
eliminate discriminatory treatment against those recipients of payments from
employers which were made on a voluntary basis, but which did not qualify as
gifts ....
23. Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962 INT. REv. BULL. No. 28, at 7.
24. Ibid.
25. Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
26. Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Florence S. Luntz, 29
T.C. 647 (1958).
27. For a discussion of these criteria with respect to application in given cases see
Pelisek, supra note 14.
28. Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1958).
29. Ginsberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1959); Lengsfield
v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957). Contra, Bounds v. United States, 262
F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958); Estate of Albert W. Morse, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 261
(1958); Marie G. Haskell, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 788 (1955).
30. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Duberstein furnished a list of potential customers to a
corporation with which he had previously done business. The corporation was able to
take advantage of the information and gave Duberstein a Cadillac automobile as a pres-
ent, although he had not expected remuneration. The Court held the transfer of the
automobile to be compensation for services rendered and not a gift.
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upon a set of "principles" derived from prior cases."' This proposal was
rejected by the Supreme Court and the Court stated that because of the
nature of the problem, the principles that govern must be general and
confined to those which have been spelled out in the past." The Court,
however, did declare that "a gift in the statutory sense . . . proceeds
from a 'detached and disinterested generosity' . . . 'out of affection,
respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.' "8 The controlling element
is the intention with which the payment is made, and the proper criterion
to determine intention is the "basic reason" for the conduct-the "domi-
nant reason" that explains the making of the transfer. 4 The Court also
recognized that each case must be decided by the fact-finding tribunal
and appellate review of the decision must be quite restricted with reversal
being limited to cases where the trier of fact was "clearly erroneous."3
While the Duberstein case did not specifically concern voluntary
payments to widows, it has had an effect in the area. The Tax Court
took the position that Duberstein "clarified" and "developed" the law
governing voluntary transfers, which included payments to widows,"
and it has held against the widows in every case since.3 The district
courts, on the other hand, have generally held that Duberstein did not
change the law but merely reaffirmed prior principles established in the
Hellstrom case." The courts of appeal have affirmed the district court
cases which have held in favor of the widow. 9 However, the circuits
31. The Government proposed that "Gifts should be defined as transfers of prop-
erty made for personal as distinguished from business reasons." Id. at 284 n. 6. The
proposed test was derived from the following propositions: (1) payments by an em-
ployer to an employee, even though voluntary, should generally be taxable, (2) the
concept of a gift is inconsistent with a payment being a deductible business expense,
(3) a gift involves personal elements, and (4) a business corporation cannot properly
make a gift of its assets. Id. at 287.
32. Id. at 284.
33. Id. at 285.
34. Id. at 286.
35. Id. at 290.
36. Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960), rev'd sub nom. Poyner v.
Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
37. Lucile McCrea Evans, 39 T.C. No. 56 (1962); Margaret H. D. Penick, 37
T.C. No. 98 (1962) ; Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1144 (1961) ;
Roy I. Martin, 36 T.C. 556 (1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
904 (1962) ; Estate of Rose A. Russek, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 123 (1961) ; Mildred W.
Smith, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 904 (1962) ; Mary Westphal, 37 T.C. No. 36 (1961) ; Estate of Martin Kuntz,
Sr., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 903 (1962) ; Ivan Y. Nickerson, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1508 (1960).
38. Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), affd, 302 F.2d
666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp.
223 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
39. United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962), affirming 192 F. Supp.
766 (D. Minn. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; United States v. Kasynski, 284
NOTES
have produced divergent results in appeals from the Tax Court cases
holding against the widow.4"
The first appellate decision after Duberstein that upheld a district
court's determination that payments to a widow were gifts was United
States v. Kasynski. There, the requirements established in the Hell-
strom case 2 were satisfied. As was typical in earlier cases, the deceased
and his family controlled the payer corporation. In similar fact situa-
tions, district courts, in Rice v. United States43 and Frankel v. United
States,44 also found that the payments were exempt from taxation. These
precedents have been generally observed by district courts in later cases. 5
The first case decided by the Tax Court concerning payments to
widows, subsequent to Duberstein, was Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont.46
There, the deceased, who had owned two-thirds of the payer corporation,
had been fully compensated, and the payments were made to the widow.
The corporate resolution which authorized the expenditures declared that
recognition of the deceased's past services had given rise to the payments.
In addition, the corporation treated the payments as an expense. On
these facts, the Tax Court concluded that the payments were remunera-
tion because the record did not satisfy the Duberstein requirement that a
gift proceed from a "detached and disinterested generosity." On re-
view, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressed in its opinion
that on essentially identical facts in prior cases the Tax Court had held
for the widow, and a contrary determination was unwarranted. The
decision was vacated and remanded for additional findings, in as much
as other recent cases suggested that additional factors, i.e., the widow's
corporate holdings and needs, were necessary criteria in determining the
F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960). The appellate courts followed the principle laid down in
Duberstein that their review was limited and primary consideration must be given to
the findings of the trier of fact.
40. In Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962), and Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the determination of the
Tax Court. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
reversed the Tax Court in Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 903 (1962), and Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 903 (1962). The Fourth Circuit, in Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287
(4th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded the decision of the Tax Court for additional
findings.
41. 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
42. Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
43. 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
44. 192 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1961), affd, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 903 (1962).
45. For a discussion of other district court cases since Duberstein see Note,
Payments to Widows of Corporate Executives and Employees-Gifts or Income?, 49 VA.
L. R-v. 74 (1963).
46. 35 T.C. 65 (1960), rev'd, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
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"dominant reason" and none of the stipulated facts in the case em-
braced such criteria.
In Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr.,4" a widow received payments from
a family corporation pursuant to a resolution which declared the pay-
ments to be additional compensation for past services. Likewise, the
corporation treated the payments as a salary expense. The deceased had
been fully compensated, but the Tax Court emphasized the wording of
the resolution and held the payments taxable. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that the resolution controlled
and reversed the decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also reversed the deci-
sion of the Tax Court in Estate of W. R. Olsen48 where similar payments
were involved. However, there was no significant ownership in the
corporation by either the deceased, the widow, or their families. The
inference drawn by the Tax Court, based upon a study of the corporate
resolution, that the payments proceeded from the constraining force of
a moral duty was rejected by the reviewing court.
Payments were made to a widow by a family corporation in Mildred
W. Smith.4" Although, as in the earlier Tax Court cases, the require-
ments established before Duberstein had been met, the Tax Court held the
payments taxable. The court pointed out that while weight was given
to a decrease in the widow's income, the other sources of income, which
were substantial, were not considered. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in affirming expressed the opinion that the conclusion of
the Tax Court was permissive and under the Duberstein case its review
was narrow.
The facts in Roy I. Martin5 also resembled those in the earlier cases
with the payer corporation being closely held by the deceased and his
family. Again, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the
determination of the Tax Court not clearly erroneous and supported the
court's conclusion that the payments were taxable income. Both courts
stressed the failure of the board of directors to adequately consider the
needs of the widow and the omission of dividends by the corporation in
the past.
47. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 1379 (1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 903 (1962).
48. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 903 (1962).
49. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961), affd, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denocd,
371 U.S. 904 (1962).
50. 36 T.C. 556 (1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962).
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As a result of these decisions, there now exists a split among the
circuits whether the voluntary payments are income or gifts. The Courts
of Appeal for the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have either af-
firmed district court determinations or reversed Tax Court cases which
have not allowed the gift."' The Fourth Circuit also appears to favor
the gift category."2 On the other hand, the Third Circuit has upheld Tax
Court conclusions classifying the payments as income."8
While the courts which have held the payments to be income have
justified their decisions on the language contained in Duberstein, the facts
in the cases are so similar that an intelligible reconciliation is impossible.
The more cases decided, the more pronounced the disagreement be-
comes."' Ironically, the Court in Duberstein stated that factual differ-
ences in gift cases will serve as precedent and uncertainty will be some-
what eliminated.,' Yet in the face of this conflict, the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari. "
The facts in the cases recently decided by the Tax Court are typical
of the cases before Duberstebn. The prevalent characteristics are (1) con-
trol of the corporation by the widow or her family and (2) the corpora-
tion charging the payments against income. In consideration of these
circumstances, the present approach of the Tax Court that payments are
taxable is sound and reflects good judgment and insight. The court's deci-
sions should be upheld and accepted by the other courts to effect a fair
and impartial administration of the tax law.
In reversing its prior position, the court eliminated a gross defect in
the tax laws which permitted the corporation to treat the payment as a
tax deduction and the widow to treat it as a gift and exclude it from
income. If the payment is treated in such a manner, especially in the
51. Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962), reversing 19 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; Olsen v. Commissioner, 302
F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1962), re'versing 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1961), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 903 (1962) ; United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962), affirming 192
F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; United States v. Kasyn-
ski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
52. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
53. Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 556(1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962) ; Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.
1962), affirming 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961), cert. dended, 371 U.S. 904 (1962).
54. For a detailed discussion of the cases that followed in both the Tax Court and
district courts see Note, supra note 45.
55. 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960).
56. Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903
(1962) ; Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904(1962); Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903
(1962); Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962); United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903
(1962).
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context of the closely held corporation, a tax avoidance is possible that
challenges the integrity of the tax system. The large number of cases
litigated during the last decade indicates the increased use of corporate
payments to widows." The practice would inevitably have caused Con-
gress to enact corrective legislation. The enlightened treatment by the
Tax Court somewhat reduces the need for this remedy.
Where transactions between related persons have occurred in other
situations, they have been subjected to close examination. This is espe-
cially so with controlled corporations."8 The courts and Congress have
already expressed their aversion to such transactions. The courts have
utilized the doctrines of anticipatory assignment of income"0 and con-
structive dividends 6 to thwart taxpayers who deal with closely held cor-
porations from avoiding taxation. Congress, on the other hand, has
enacted legislation that disallows losses and certain expenses between
corporations and those who control them.61 This disallowance applies
not only to those who maintain direct control, but also to someone whose
family controls it." Based upon these pronouncements, there is inherent
in the tax system a policy that transactions between corporations and
related taxpayers are to receive close scrutiny, and if questionable, are to
be denied the treatment accorded those engaged in arm's length trans-
actions. The reasons for such a policy justify its existence. Often,
nothing more than tax saving motives underly these transactions, 3 and
no real change in the economic interests of the parties occurs.64
This policy should be applied to the payments to widows. Because
of the control that prevails, the payment can be made at the whim of the
recipient, if a tax saving motive exists. The absence of an arn's length
transfer denies the assurance that a "detached and disinterested gener-
osity" gave rise to the payment. Moreover, the close ownership does
not change the total economic interests of the widow, her family, and
the corporation.
57. For a collection and discussion of those cases see Pelisek, supra note 14.
58. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (loss on sale to controlled corporation);
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (corporate reorganization).
59. Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939), affirming 103 F.2d 110 (7th
Cir.).
60. Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1951) (salaries) ; United States v.
E. Regensburg & Sons, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1944) (loans); Timberlake v. Commis-
sioner, 132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942) (sale of property at less than fair market value).
61. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 267(a) (1).
62. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 267(c) (2).
63. P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 732 (1945).
64. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947).
65. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
520
NOTES
With the widow or her family controlling the payer corporation, any
factual determination concerning the transfer and the intent of the parties
becomes difficult.6" Under such circumstances, the opportunity to re-
move corporate income from taxation exists and is inviting. The con-
duct and the testimony of the family directors becomes inconsistent
when the interests of the corporation and the widow are presented al-
ternatively. 7 The controlling criteria articulated by the Court in Duber-
steh to determine intent are elusive enough without the further complex-
ity of a controlled corporation. When that type of corporation is in-
jected into the problem, a determination becomes impossible.
To permit the widow to exclude the payment from gross income
presents an opportunity to use her as a conduit to funnel corporate profits
to other members of the family. Also, the payments can be used in an
informal manner to buy out the widow by the other family members or
to keep her out of the business. These possible abuses in themselves may
be sufficient to justify the position of the Tax Court. However, there
are other reasons to require the inclusion of the payment in gross income.
Where the widow, directly or indirectly, controls the corporation,
the existence of the corporate entity in effect enables her to make a gift
to herself. Had the business been organized as a proprietorship, rather
than a corporation, the ability to exclude a portion of business income
from taxation would be removed. If the widow is permitted to exclude
business income from all taxation, she obtains preferential treatment
over those who have selected other types of business organizations. No
such preferred treatment has been provided in the Code. To the con-
trary, the Code requires that the income of the corporation be taxed
initially"5 and that the same income is taxed again when distributed.69
In other cases where a shareholder receives payments or property
from a corporation in other than a bona fide transaction, the courts have
held the transfer to be constructive dividends and taxable to the re-
cipients.7" The payments to widows, which may reasonably be classified
as dividends since no services were performed, results in a denial of
equal treatment to shareholders in other corporations if they are excluded
66. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 698 (1947).
67. An example of equivocation is Estate of Albert W. Morse, 17 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 261 (1958). There the officers of the controlled corporation claimed that the
payments were salary when the return of the corporation was examined. However, in
testifying before the Tax Court, they stated that a gift was intended.
68. INT. RLv. CODE OF 1954, § 11(a).
69. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62(a) (7).
70. Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1951) (salaries); United States v.
E. Regensburg & Sons, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1944) (loans); Timberlake v. Commis-
sioner, 132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942) (sale of property at less than fair market value).
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from gross income. For a fair and impartial administration of the tax
law to be effected, the widow should be placed in the same position as
other shareholders who transact business with corporations they control.
While recognition of the corporate entity is found in the Code,"
corporate transactions have been disregarded where used primarily to
avoid taxes."2 The courts have looked to the substance of the transac-
tion and not merely its form. In the present case, the niceties or form
of a common law gift should be disregarded, and the substantive nature
of the transfer should be recognized for what it is, i.e., an attempt to
eliminate profits from taxation Where the corporation is permitted to
charge the payments against income, the widow should be required at
least to include them in gross income so that the income is taxed some-
where.
Even where control of the corporation does not exist in the widow
or her family tax inequality may prevail. One such area is the taxation
of voluntary pensions." The facts in both situations are somewhat
similar. Neither of the recipients perform services while receiving the
voluntary payments and the payments originate from past employment.
The only significant difference is that in one case the former employee
is paid directly while in the other payment is made to the deceased em-
ployee's wife. If the employee retires and his salary is continud it is
taxed, but if he dies and his widow receives the same amount, it is ex-
empt. To exempt the payments to the widow from taxation discrimin-
ates against the pensioner. Moreover, the wife of the retired employee
should be considered as she enjoys indirectly as much benefit from the
payments received by her husband as does the widow from payments
received directly. This point is more apparent in states which have
community property laws where the wife obtains a legal interest in the
payments.74 Therefore, taxation of retirement pay while exempting pay-
ments made to a widow also discriminates against the pensioner's wife.
The courts have held that where a well established plan or pattern
exists in making the payments to widows by an employer, exclusion is not
permitted. 5 The reason for the distinction is that the company obtains
an economic benefit by retaining valuable employees when they are as-
sured their widows will be provided for. The payment appears to be
classified as additional compensation under such circumstances. While
71. NT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
72. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 437 (1940) (loss on sale to controlled corporation);
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (corporate reorganization).
73. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 62(a) (11).
74. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
75. Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1958).
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the reasoning of the courts is plausible, from the point of view of the
widow being taxed the distinction appears to be unfair and discrimina-
tory. Neither of the widows performed services nor have they done any-
thing to give rise to the payments. However, because one widow's hus-
band happened to be employed by a corporation that had a plan, she must
be taxed on the paymetns.
It is apparent that underlying the decisions that hold the payments
to be gifts is sympathy for the widow. This sentiment is manifested in
the statement of Chief Judge Sobeloff of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit:
Not the least of the difficulties often faced by a recently
widowed woman is the loss of her husband's financial support.
However, for many widows of ranking employees in companies,
the cause for worry has been alleviated by the practice of the
employer making payments to the widow for limited periods
following the husband's death .... '
While the plight of the widow is readily perceived, and may be recognized
to a limited extent in the Internal Revenue Code,7" it is questionable
whether the tax law should be interpreted in a manner that converts in-
come to exempt life insurance proceeds. Even if there is sentiment for
the position of the widow, the considerations of other taxpayers should
be weighed. They are burdened as well as the widow by taxation. It is
well established that equitable considerations have no place in the laws of
taxation."8 A fair and impartial administration of the tax laws is more
fundamental.
In summary, the present position of the Tax Court is correct and
represents a full understanding of the problem. The inequities that ex-
isted in the law prior to Duberstein. are eliminated by its approach. The
other taxpayers who are engaged in business or receive voluntary pay-
ments are afforded equal tax treatment as a result. The present conflict
that exists among the circuits concerning the taxability of the payments
should be resolved in favor of the Government to affirm the integrity of
the tax law in this area. If the other courts do not reverse their position,
the Supreme Court or Congress will have to remedy the situation.
76. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 1962), reversing sub norn.
Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960).
77. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2, provides some tax relief to a surviving spouse by
computing the tax liability on the split income provision for two years after the death
of the spouse.
78. Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237 (1955).
